This special issue offers a fresh re-evaluation of James Fowler's faith development theory, in celebration of his 60th birthday. Challenges to the theory have focused on the role of emotion in faith, the contributions of the psychodynamic unconscious, and the factor of the interpersonal. Now in its third decade, the theory continues to inspire theoretical and methodological reflections. The papers presented reflect the considerable influence of this theory. This issue's theme--"Religious Development Beyond the Modern Paradigm?"--was the topic of a symposium (...) held in Boston at the 107th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association. (shrink)

The existence of differences in time, meant to be structure ‹T,<›, where the earlier-later relation < is a linear ordering, dense and without the first and the last element, is a sine qua non condition of changes taking place at any temporal instant. Therefore it is impossible to give a definition of the operator of change ↑ (the intended meaning of the phrase „↑α” is „it is changing now what a states”) in the language Lͭ of Tense Logic calculi containing, (...) besides classical sentential connectives, temporal categories: G, H, F, P. The paper contains the proof of this statement. (shrink)

We report the identification of a recurrent, 520-kb 16p12.1 microdeletion associated with childhood developmental delay. The microdeletion was detected in 20 of 11,873 cases compared with 2 of 8,540 controls and replicated in a second series of 22 of 9,254 cases compared with 6 of 6,299 controls. Most deletions were inherited, with carrier parents likely to manifest neuropsychiatric phenotypes compared to non-carrier parents. Probands were more likely to carry an additional large copy-number variant when compared to matched controls. The clinical (...) features of individuals with two mutations were distinct from and/or more severe than those of individuals carrying only the co-occurring mutation. Our data support a two-hit model in which the 16p12.1 microdeletion both predisposes to neuropsychiatric phenotypes as a single event and exacerbates neurodevelopmental phenotypes in association with other large deletions or duplications. Analysis of other microdeletions with variable expressivity indicates that this two-hit model might be more generally applicable to neuropsychiatric disease. © 2010 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to review some aspects of brain anatomy and neurophysiology that are important for consciousness, and which hopefully may be of benefit to philosophers investigating the conscious mind. Taking as an initial point of reference the distinction between “the hard problem” and “the weak problems” of consciousness, we shall concentrate on questions pertaining to the second of these. A putative “consciousness system” in the brain will be presented, paying special attention to diffuse projection systems. The (...) “center of gravity” will be brain connectivity, since consciousness must, critically, be dependent on coherent activity and timing. “Detectors” of synchronicity and coincidence, like NMDA receptors, also necessarily play a role here. To be conscious, we do not need an entire brain. While even large hemispherectomies need not unequivocally affect consciousness, far smaller brain-stem lesions may be devastating in this regard. Even so, the recent discovery by Matthew F. Glasser et al. of 180 separate areas in the human brain cortex is intriguing from a teleological perspective, as it is quite unthinkable that any of them could be “redundant. (shrink)

In his paper the author focuses on the analysis of 1. Kuhn's self-reflection, his discovery of hermeneutics and its importance for the new way of reading and understanding the text, 2. Kuhn's comprehension of the relation between history and philosophy of science and of many different factors which influence upon forming and development of a modern history of science, 3. Working out of Kuhn's specific conceptional apparatus , 4. Kuhn's cycle of scientific knowledge and 5. some methodological controversions concerning incomensurability (...) of scientific paradigms, understandig of the normal science and Kuhn's antirealism. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to criticize materialism in the philosophy of mind and to search for alternative approaches to the problems of mind, consciousness and body. According to the author, materialism does not present a satisfactory explanation of the mental life of human beings, because it fails to explain phenomena such as conscious experience, sleep, unconsciousness, death. These phenomena point to the fact that consciousness is not identical with the body and can be detached from it. The (...) author adopts the conclusion that the solution to the problem of consciousness is closely connected to the problem of identity of a human individual. A human being plays certain social roles, he or she possesses a body, he or she possesses a mind, but is not identical with them. In its essence, the human being is identical with consciousness. (shrink)

Drugie wydanie książki prof. dr Rosenberga zawiera, jak autor sam zaznacza, tylko niewielkie stylistyczne poprawki w stosunku do wydania pierwszego, które ukazało się w roku 1983. Na uwagę zasługuje to, że omawiane wydanie ukazało się w renomowanym wydawnictwie Hacketta. Wydanie pierwsze zainteresowało raczej akademickie kręgi filozofów i psychologów. Rosenberg jest profesorem filozofii analitycznej w Uniwersytecie North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Z jego bibliografii obejmującej kilkadziesiąt pozycji na szczególną uwagę zasługują książki: Linguistic Representation, One World and our Knowledge of It, The (...) Thinking Self, Beyond Formalism: Naming and Necessity for Human Beings. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to review some aspects of brain anatomy and neurophysiology that are important for consciousness, and which hopefully may be of benefit to philosophers investigating the conscious mind. Taking as an initial point of reference the distinction between “the hard problem” and “the weak problems” of consciousness, we shall concentrate on questions pertaining to the second of these. A putative “consciousness system” in the brain will be presented, paying special attention to diffuse projection systems. The (...) “center of gravity” will be brain connectivity, since consciousness must, critically, be dependent on coherent activity and timing. “Detectors” of synchronicity and coincidence, like NMDA receptors, also necessarily play a role here. To be conscious, we do not need an entire brain. While even large hemispherectomies need not unequivocally affect consciousness, far smaller brain-stem lesions may be devastating in this regard. Even so, the recent discovery by Matthew F. Glasser et al. of 180 separate areas in the human brain cortex is intriguing from a teleological perspective, as it is quite unthinkable that any of them could be “redundant. (shrink)

Zagadnienia, na których skupia się Bernard J. F. Lonergan SJ, kanadyjski filozof i teolog, dotyczą głównie teorii poznania, logiki i metodologii. W czasie podstawowego kursu filozofii Lonergan studiował matematykę, co wywarło wpływ nie tylko na jego ogólne spojrzenie na filozofię i teologię, lecz także na rozumienie ich naukowych metod. Podstawowe dzieło Lonergana Insight było początkowo zaplanowane jako praca z zakresu metodologii teologicznej. W głównej mierze znajdujemy w niej filozoficzne studium nad ludzkim rozumowaniem: co właściwie czynię, gdy poznaję? O ile w (...) Insight poznanie jest zasadniczo rozumiane jako czynność ścisłe intelektualna, o tyle w następnej kluczowej książce Method in Theology Lonergan odwojuje się także do odczuć, traktując je jako intencjonalne odpowiedzi na wartości. (shrink)

Przed laty w Philosophical Review opublikowano wyjątki z zapisków F. Waismanna pod tytułem Notatki z rozmów z Wittgensteinem. Obok angielskiego tłumaczenia zamieszczono niemiecki tekst rozmowy. Z niewyjaśnionych nigdy racji zarówno w tłumaczeniu, jak i w tekście niemieckim nie ukazał się tytuł „O Heideggerze". Tytuł ten występuje w rękopisie Waismanna. Z publikacji usunięto również pierwsze i ostatnie zdanie omawianego fragmentu notatek. Zdanie pierwsze brzmi: „Potrafię dobrze zrozumieć, co Heidegger rozumie przez Bycie i Trwogę ”. Według wszelkiego prawdopodobieństwa Wittgenstein odwołuje się w (...) tym miejscu do znanego artykułu Heideggera Co to jest metafizyka?. (shrink)

Przed laty w Philosophical Review opublikowano wyjątki z zapisków F. Waismanna pod tytułem Notatki z rozmów z Wittgensteinem. Obok angielskiego tłumaczenia zamieszczono niemiecki tekst rozmowy. Z niewyjaśnionych nigdy racji zarówno w tłumaczeniu, jak i w tekście niemieckim nie ukazał się tytuł „O Heideggerze". Tytuł ten występuje w rękopisie Waismanna. Z publikacji usunięto również pierwsze i ostatnie zdanie omawianego fragmentu notatek. Zdanie pierwsze brzmi: „Potrafię dobrze zrozumieć, co Heidegger rozumie przez Bycie i Trwogę ”. Według wszelkiego prawdopodobieństwa Wittgenstein odwołuje się w (...) tym miejscu do znanego artykułu Heideggera Co to jest metafizyka?. (shrink)

Niniejszy artykuł stawia sobie za cel udzie lenie odpowiedzi na pytanie, jak przedstawia się zagadnienie postępu oraz końca historii w myśli Kanta i tzw. filozofii postępu. Usiłuje to uczynić z punktu widzenia myśli Piepera – najbardziej uznanego filozofa nurtu realistycznego w XX wieku w Niemczech. Podstawową literaturą tych analiz stały się jego dwie najważniejsze pozycje: U¨ ber das Ende der Zeit i Hoffnung und Geschichte. Ważne uzupeł nienia stanowią informacje pochodzące od prof. Bertholda Walda, najwybitniejszego ucznia Pie pera i zarazem (...) kontynuatora jego myśli. Autor zaczerpnął je z licznych rozmów i konsultacji przeprowadzonych w 2005 i 2006 r. Pozwalają one sądzić, że wiernie odczytał on spojrzenie myśliciela z Mu¨nster. Autor odwołał się również do rozpraw Kanta z zakresu filozofii dziejów: Der Streit der Fakulta¨ten, Das Ende aller Dinge. Wychodząc więc z tej perspektywy i od takich danych, autor artykułu wskazuje na elementy wspólne występujące u powyższych myślicieli w spojrzeniu na problem postępu oraz końca historii. Należy do nich m.in. wiara w ciągły postęp ludzkości, przeświadczenie o pomyślnym kresie historii, możliwości zbudowania Miasta Bożego na ziemi, spełnienia siebie i swego przeznaczenia wewnątrz historii za sprawą działania człowieka, a nie Boga. Owszem, brzmi to dziś niewiarygodnie, ale oświecenie, którego wyrazicielem była myśl wymienionych filozofów, obwieszczało tak bardzo obiecujące oblicze postępu, że zapewnić on miał realizację siebie i wszystkich swych żądań oraz oczekiwań. W artykule tym wskazuje się iluzje w ten sposób rozumianego postępu, biegu dziejów i jego końca. Idea postępu oraz rozwoju historycznego ma teologiczne źródło, a okazuje się nim pozaczasowy koniec, czyli idea Nowego Nieba i Nowej Ziemi. Zarówno Kant, jak i myśliciele postępu przejmują tę ostatnią ideę od chrześcijaństwa, nie uwzględniając jej treści. Innymi słowy, kreś- ląc wizje postępu, dziejów i ich końca posługują się pojęciami teologicznymi w ich nieteologicznym znaczeniu, czyli sekularyzują je. W artykule ukazana zostanie również pewna odmienność, zachodząca pomiędzy ujęciem filozofii postępu a myślą Kanta jako bardziej realistyczną, bliższą chrześcijaństwu. Podczas gdy Hegel, Fichte, Go¨res, Novalis nie liczą się z możliwością wewnętrzczasowego złego końca dziejów, o jakim mówi Apokalipsa, Kant nie wyklucza słuszności interpretacji chrześcijańskiej. Podstawowy zarzut Piepera względem koncepcji Kanta i filozofii postępu dotyczy złudnego i rodzącego rozpacz przeświadczenia, że podmiotem historii jest wy- łącznie człowiek. W artykule wskazuje się na właściwą postawę w obliczu wewnątrzczasowego złego końca dziejów w postaci katastrofy, czy na nadzieję. Katastrofa bowiem poprzedza pozaczasowy koniec – Nowe Niebo i Nową Ziemię. (shrink)

Zagadnienia, na których skupia się Bernard J. F. Lonergan SJ, kanadyjski filozof i teolog, dotyczą głównie teorii poznania, logiki i metodologii. W czasie podstawowego kursu filozofii Lonergan studiował matematykę, co wywarło wpływ nie tylko na jego ogólne spojrzenie na filozofię i teologię, lecz także na rozumienie ich naukowych metod. Podstawowe dzieło Lonergana Insight było początkowo zaplanowane jako praca z zakresu metodologii teologicznej. W głównej mierze znajdujemy w niej filozoficzne studium nad ludzkim rozumowaniem: co właściwie czynię, gdy poznaję? O ile w (...) Insight poznanie jest zasadniczo rozumiane jako czynność ścisłe intelektualna, o tyle w następnej kluczowej książce Method in Theology Lonergan odwojuje się także do odczuć, traktując je jako intencjonalne odpowiedzi na wartości. (shrink)

W spisanych przez L. Wittgensteina pod koniec życia Bemerkungen über die Farben znajdujemy kilka 'zagadek' dotyczących kolorów, np.: 1. „Jak to się dzieje, że coś przezroczystego może być zielone, ale nie może być białe". 2. „niepodobna sobie wyobrazić czystą białą wodę". 3. „Ale kolor świeci za sprawą swego otoczenia, w swym otoczeniu. Szary jednak nie świeci. 4. „? W obrazie biel musi być najjaśniejszym kolorem". „Nieprawda, że w obrazie biel zawsze musi być najjaśniejszym kolorem. Z pewnością jednak jest nim w (...) płaskiej kombinacji plam barwnych". 5. „Dlaczego nie ma brązowego światła ani szarego?" „Dlaczego niepodobna sobie wyobrazić szarego żaru". 6. „Czyż nie mogliby istnieć ludzie, dla których istnieje niebieskawy żółty, czerwonawy zielony? A zatem tacy ludzie, których pojecia o kolorach odbiegają od naszych pojęć?". (shrink)

Józef M. Bocheński began his philosophical career as an eclectic philosopher, then switched to Thomism and finally became a representative of the analytic school. As a Thomist he wanted to reform this orientation by the resources of modern formal logic. This tendency culminated in the establishment of the Cracow Circle (established in 1936) whose members were Bocheński, Jan F. Drewnowski, Jan Salamucha, and Bolesław Sobociński. However, the program of the Cracow Circle was rejected by most Thomists who considered traditional (...) logic as an entirely sufficient device of philosophy. Bocheński was very disappointed by this attitude of his Thomist fellows. His evolution toward analytic philosophy, free of any ideological pressure, can be regarded as his reaction to the conservatism of Thomism. (shrink)

J.M. Bocheński together with J. Salamucha, B. Sobociński, and J.F. Drewnowski formed the so-called Cracow Circle in the 30s of the previous century. Its main aim was to utilize contemporary logic in theology and philosophy of God. The first work in this area was Salamucha’s formal analysis of the prima via, published in 1934. The article was reviewed by Bocheński, who provided a number of remarks concerning Salamucha’s analysis. At that time he did not decide to conduct a holistic research (...) into the prima via. That was done by him only at the end of his life as part of the logical analysis of the quinque viae. This paper aims at presenting Bocheński’s unpublished formal analysis of the prima via from 1953 and proving that it constitutes a valuable completion of his published formal analyses, which come from the 1980s and 1990s. Above all, they provide a more insightful analysis of the notion of movement in the prima via, as well as the form of axiom expressing the lack of regress into infinity. In the formalizations of 1953 there are also interesting analyses concerning the ancestral closure of three-argument relations. (shrink)

The Belgian conflict can be compared with a game theoretical model with two groups and a negative sum-game. Within each of the groups there is hierarchisation, role playing and formation ofcoalitions. On the Flemish side the main actor is the CVP, on the Walloon side it is the PS.The main objectives of the communities in the economie field are: temporary boarding employment in depressed industries and, simultaneously, the creation of high tech industries. Policy instruments to attain those goals are : (...) general economie measures ; selective-protective measures ; selective-innovative measures.Why is the sum-game negative or at least suboptimal?1. Mentioned policy instruments are spread over an incoherent set of institutions on the national and regional level, with rules that are partly centralist, partly federalist, partly confederalist. This leads to a complicated, unstable set of game rules in which the financial implications of decisions are shifted from the regional to the national level and vice versa.2. Selective-protective measures are of such large size that they offset and erode the beneficial effects of general policy measures regarding wages, taxes and exchange rate.Federalism or confederalism would and should establish a new set of rules between the two regions and between regional and federal state. Since a return to the ancien régime is politically unfeasible, this is the only logical way out of the present chaotic decision making process. Federalism would, inter alia, shift the financial responsibility of decisions in the field of industrial policy, education, health and public works towards the regions.This political reform requires a new constitution and therefore an agreement between the two communities. The chances for a new «talk» are presently not very high. Among the many reasons, one in particular strikes the eye : the major partner on the Flemish side, namely the Christian Democrats, have a multi-dimensional utility function, which not only is «concealed» for the others, but also undefined and unclear for the party itself. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

This book consists of the edited proceedings of a debate among Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Leszek Kolakowski that was held in Warsaw in May of 1995. It includes also commentary from those in attendance, including extensive remarks by Ernest Gellner. The debate marked the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and focussed primarily on topics related to historicism and cultural relativism.

The presented paper focuses on the analysis of strategic documents at the level of the European Union concerning the regulation of artificial intelligence as one of the so-called disruptive technologies. In the first part of the article, we outline the basic terminology. Subsequently, we focus on the summarizing and systemizing of the key documents adopted at the EU level in terms of artificial intelligence regulation. The focus of the paper is devoted to issues of personal data protection and cyber security (...) included in these strategic documents. The final part contains recommendations for future research and evaluation of its key features. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

In the article author analyses the extent to which it is possible to regard the Aristotelian conception of the soul as actually necessary and applicable for modern neuroscience. The framework in which this objective is going to be accomplished is provided by the idea of the coexistence of the “manifest” and “scientific” images of the world and persons, as introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. In subsequent sections, author initially formulates an answer to the questions of what it is that Aristotle sought (...) to explain with his conception of soul as formal cause, and how this notion could be portrayed in terms drawn from contemporary neurological science. It is author’s intention to show that no other concepts—be they the Cartesian “mind” or a Chalmers-style “self”—come anywhere close to matching the breadth of scope of Aristotelian “soul”. At the same time, though, analysis carried out here do not intend to undertake any kind of defence of the soul as a spiritual entity of the sort popular where religious faith is concerned, namely as an entity separable from the body, immortal, and inimitably tied to God. Then, in the second major part of the article, author analyses the extent to which the Aristotelian conception of the soul can be thought of as involving criteria of the sort that we encounter in the contemporary theory of strong emergence. According to the author the theory of strong emergence has, as a heuristic theory, quite general predictive and explanatory power as regards the field of human thought and behaviour. (shrink)

I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian (...) decisions sometimes must include non-rational desires such as appetite. Consequently, any exegetical account of Aristotle’s notion of decision must be able to accommodate this feature. (shrink)

The Struggle for Nature outlines and examines the main aspects of current environmental philosophy including deep ecology, social and political ecology, eco-feminism and eco-anarchism. It criticises the dependency on science of these philosophies and the social problems engendered by them. The author argues for a post-naturalistic turn in environmental philosophy. The Struggle for Nature presents the most up-to-date arguments in environmental philosophy, which will be valuable reading for students of applied philosophy, environmental studies and geography.

The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...) still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)

I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct (...) authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē. (shrink)

The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of (...) human non-rational desires. (shrink)